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Tax Treatment of Artists'
Charitable Contributions
The Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1969 to restrict sharply
the tax deduction available to artists who donate their compositions
to charity.' Since that amendment, the number of charitable contribu-
tions by artists to museums and libraries has declined precipitously.
2
Consequently, the public's ability to enjoy access to recent artistic and
scholarly materials has suffered.3
Legislation in this area should be reevaluated to achieve the optimal
accommodation of competing social objectives. This Note develops
three policies that should influence the tax treatment of charitable
contributions by creators of their compositions: the provision of an
incentive to contribute; government subsidy of donations motivated
1. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, I.R.C.
§ 170(e)(1). For discussion of the 1969 amendment and of the prior law, see pp. 145-47
infra.
2. See, e.g., Letter from L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress, to Rep. Mills
(Feb. 13, 1973), reprinted in Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6287-88 (1973) (contributions to Library of
Congress of self-generated manuscripts declined from about 230 musical manuscripts and
179,000 literary manuscripts annually to zero donations in 1971 and 1972) [hearings here-
inafter cited as 1973 Hearings]; Letter from Richard E. Oldenburg, Director, New York
Museum of Modern Art, to John M. Martin, Chief Counsel, House Ways and Means
Comm. (April 18, 1973), reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra, at 6143 (gifts of works of art
by their creators to Museum of Modern Art declined from 321 in three years prior to
1969 to 28 in three years after). This virtual cessation of charitable giving by creators has
become a fact of life for museums and university libraries nationwide. See 1973 Hearings,
supra, at 6110 (statement of Authors' League of America) (Columbia University reported
90% decline in number of authors' papers and manuscripts received in 1971); id. at 6138
(statement of American Library Association) (similar experience of other academic
libraries). Evidence contained in a Library of Congress study suggests that the trend has
not abated in more recent years. U.S. Library of Congress, LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND
ARTISTIC DONATIONS TO THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 10,191-92
(1975) [hereinafter cited as LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY]; see 122 CONG. REc. 23,360 (1976)
(Sen. Javits) (citing reports of continuing trend).
3. Some creators have begun placing their compositions "on deposit" without trans-
ferring title, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 2, at 10,192 (deposit practice
unsatisfactory because recipients unwilling to organize material without assurance of full
title); selling their compositions, which results in "dispersal of historically important
materials among many private collectors, thereby making this material unavailable for
future scholarship or making it very difficult for scholars to locate", see id.; or withhold-
ing their works entirely, possibly awaiting more favorable tax treatment, or intending to
make a charitable bequest at death or to leave their compositions to their heirs as part of
their estates, see id.
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by charitable purposes but not those motivated solely by financial
benefits; and consideration of horizontal equity and economic ef-
ficiency. Neither prior law, nor present law, nor recent legislative
proposals are fully responsive to these criteria. This Note, however,
proposes an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code that would
further all three policy considerations.
I. The Design and Impact of the 1969 Amendment
Since 1917, taxpayers have been allowed a deduction from gross in-
come for charitable contributions. 4 From 1917 until 1969, contribu-
tions of appreciated property were deductible from gross income at the
fair market value of the donated property.5 This fair market value rule
provided donors of appreciated property with a deduction in the
amount of basis plus unrealized appreciation, even though they had
never been taxed on the unrealized appreciation.6
The fair market value rule, however, had two incidental effects that
Congress considered unacceptable. First, some taxpayers could benefit
more from contributing their property than from selling it; a taxpayer
in a marginal tax bracket above fifty percent could receive a greater tax
benefit from using the deduction to offset other highly taxed income
than he could earn from the sale of the property, after paying the high
taxes on the gain from the sale.7 Second, the fair market value rule
4. The charitable contributions deduction was first enacted by the War Revenue Act
of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300 (now I.R.C. § 170). The deduction was enacted in
response to concern that the increased tax rates legislated to finance World War I would
decrease the amounts contributed to charitable organizations. See 55 CoNG. REc. 6728-29
(1917) (remarks of Sen. Hollis and reprinted newspaper editorials). See generally C. KAHN,
PERSONAL DEDUcTONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 6-7, 46-47 (1960) (summarizing amend-
ment's legislative history).
5. See Mansfield and Groves, Legal Aspects of Charitable Contributions of Appreciated
Property to Public Charities, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2251, 2251-52 (1977) (summarizing positions of
Treasury Department and Congress on issue of fair market value deduction between 1917
and 1969) [book hereinafter cited as FILER PAPERS).
6. For instance, if an artist painted a painting using materials costing $10 and con-
tributed it to a charitable organization when it was worth $100, he received an itemized
deduction from adjusted gross income of $100. The $10 paid for the painting was drawn
from after-tax income; a tax had been paid when the money was earned. The $90 in
appreciation in value was never taxed, however, as the gain was never taken into income.
If the painting were sold instead of donated, the $90 would have been taxed as ordinary
income.
7. Earned income is taxed at a maximum rate of 50%, I.R.C. § 1348, (provision enacted
in Tax Reform Act of 1969), but unearned income is taxed at rates up to 70%, I.R.C.
§ 1. In the example in note 6 supra, if the taxpayer were in the 70% marginal tax bracket,
and he sold the painting, he would earn $55 ($100 - .5($90)) after taxes on his initial in-
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favored gifts of appreciated property over gifts of cash; cash donations
were drawn from income subject to taxation, while any appreciation of
contributed property escaped taxation."
To eliminate these effects, Congress amended the Internal Revenue
Code in 1969 so that charitable contributions of ordinary income
property,9 including creator-held creative compositions,'0 generate a
vestment of $10. However, if he contributed the painting to a qualifying charity, he would
receive a deduction of $100, which would offset taxes on other unearned income by $70
(.7 X $100). Thus a sale would yield only $45 on the entire transaction ($55 - S10); the
donation would benefit the taxpayer by $60 ($70 - $10). This example, like all examples in
this Note, is simplified and ignores effects of the interaction of the maximum tax on
earned income and the minimum tax on tax preference items, which alter the precise tax
benefit of a tax deduction. This simplification assumes that taxpayers have an effective
marginal tax rate of 70% and that they have substantially more unearned income than
earned income. While very few taxpayers actually may be in this bracket, the Code
should account for this situation even if it arises rarely in practice. See p. 163 infra.
In general, for any taxpayer in a tax bracket above 50%, the fair market value rule
C + .5A
could lead to a gift being more profitable than a sale whenever m > E + where m is
the marginal tax rate, C is the cost or basis, and A is the amount of unrealized apprecia-
tion. As C/A approaches zero, profits from a gift, designated as 7r, will become greater
than profits from a sale, 7r., as m becomes greater than .5. As C/A increases, m must in-
crease for 7r to be greater than 7r.. That is, if C/A = .25, 7rg> 7rs only when m > .6. When
C/A> 2/3, it is impossible for 7r, to be greater than 7r., because m cannot be greater than
.7 under present income tax rates.
8. For example, compare the gift of a painting worth $100 at time of gift, with a basis
to the donor of $10, with the contribution of $100 in cash. The former donation generated
a $100 deduction without the imposition of any tax on the $90 of appreciation. The latter
gift also entitled the donor to a $100 deduction, but this deduction offset the income tax
that was already paid when the 5100 was earned. If the two taxpayers were in the maximum
50% bracket on earned income, the first individual earned $20 originally, of which $10
remained after taxes to purchase the materials for the painting, which, when contributed,
generated a $100 deduction. The second taxpayer, however, had to earn $200 before taxes
to retain $100 to donate to generate a $100 deduction.
9. "Ordinary income property" is defined as property with appreciation that would not
have been a long-term capital gain if the property had been sold for its fair market value
by the donor at the time of the gift. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(1) (1972).
10. See I.R.C. § 1221 (defining "capital asset" specifically to exclude "a copyright, a
literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property,
held by .. . a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property"). When Congress
sought to limit deductions for contributions of creative compositions, it employed the
distinction between capital gains and ordinary income by permitting only the basis of
ordinary income property to be deducted. When Congress decided to restrict deductions
for gifts of other similar types of property, the capital gains distinction was used again.
Thus, § 514(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 added letters, memoranda, and papers to
the list of exclusions from capital asset status. Government publications received by the
taxpayer at no or reduced charge were excluded from the definition of a capital asset by
§ 2132 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 1221(6). Finally, special rules for de-
termining allowable deductions for contributions of inventory, which is ordinary income
property under I.R.C. § 1221(1), were provided by § 2135 of the 1976 Act, I.R.C. § 170(e)(3).
The proposal recommended in this Note also uses the capital gains distinction to reform
the tax treatment of artists' donations. See pp. 164-67 infra.
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deduction in the amount of only the basis. 1 Thus, since 1969, chari-
table contributions by creators of their compositions have been
deductible only to the extent of the cost of the materials used to create
the composition.1
2
This rule was responsive to the two concerns that motivated the
1969 amendments: it is now impossible for a creator to benefit more
by contributing his composition than by selling it,13 and the tax ad-
vantages enjoyed by creators donating appreciated property rather than
cash have been eliminated. 14 However, the 1969 amendment has had
11. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, I.R.C.
§ 170(e)(1). The House version of the bill would have limited the charitable contributions
deduction to the cost of the donated property for the following five types of property:
property contributed to private foundations other than private operating foundations;
ordinary income property; tangible personal property; future property interests; and
bargain-sale property. See H.R. RE. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1969), reprinted
in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1700-01.
The Ways and Means Committee Report articulated two reasons for applying the cost
deduction rule to contributions of creator-held appreciated property: the "double de-
duction" nature of a deduction for appreciation that was never taxed, and the difficulty
of valuing art work coupled with the tendency of artists to overvalue their own work.
Id. at 53-55, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. 9- AD. Nmws at 1700-01.
The Senate version of the charitable contributions section of the bill was less sweeping.
The Senate Finance Committee deleted the House provisions that would have reduced
the allowable deductions for contributions of appreciated tangible personal property,
future interests in appreciated property, and bargain-sale property, justifying the deletion
by pointing to the provisions' potentially adverse impact on charitable giving and failure
to solve the valuation problem. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969), re-
printed in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2111.
Contributed property is placed in one of three categories for tax purposes: ordinary
income property; unrelated-use tangible personal property; and, intangible personal, real,
and related-use tangible personal property. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1). Unrelated-use property is
property that the donee puts to a use unrelated to the purpose constituting the basis of
the donee's tax exemption. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(1) (1972). The 1969 amend-
ment concerns contributions only of appreciated property. Cash contributions were not
affected and remain fully deductible.
12. It is unclear why the special tax advantages for gifts of creator-held property were
eliminated, while identical benefits for contributors of other types of appreciated property
were either limited less severely-in the case of unrelated-use tangible personal property-
or left intact-in the case of real, intangible personal, and related-use tangible personal
property. This harsh treatment of artists seems to stem from doubts regarding the value
of art in general and from concern about the danger of fraudulent valuation of contribu-
tions. When asked to explain the differential treatment accorded ordinaiy income property
contributions and other types of gifts, Rep. Mills replied, "Paintings and other art objects
are very hard to value. As a result very high values are placed on paintings which cost the
person very little. Who is to say how much the painting is really worth?" 115 CONG.
Rsc. 22,571 (1969). But see note 39 infra (valuation of art no longer problem).
13. This can be proved as follows: r, = A(1-m), and r = C(m-1); if m < 1, then r. >0,
and 7rg < 0. Therefore, r. > 7r-. See note 7 supra.
14. Since 1969, the artist who paints a painting with $10 worth of materials and
contributes it when it has a market value of $100 receives a deduction of $10. If he is in
the 70% bracket, this offsets his taxes on unearned income by $7, netting him a loss of
$3 after subtracting the $10 cost. The fact that his painting has appreciated in value
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other, undesirable effects. Creators' contributions of their compositions
now are treated quite differently from gifts of similar compositions by
collectors; a composition in the hands of its creator is ordinary income
property, deductible only up to its basis, while the identical composi-
tion in the possession of a collector is deductible up to its fair market
value.15 This restriction on deductions for contributions of creator-
held compositions has resulted in a virtual cessation of contributions
by living creators of their works.1 6 Some artists have begun to sell their
works or to withhold them indefinitely.'7 These compositions are at
least temporarily, and possibly permanently, inaccessible to the public.
II. Three Policies to Guide a New Rule
The 1969 amendment responded to two problems generated by the
fair market value rule for charitable contributions by creators of their
compositions. But the restricted deduction allowed since 1969 itself
has spawned serious deficiencies. Before yet another piece of legislation
is proposed, the basic questions underlying this area of the Code should
be reconsidered. From an analysis that focuses on the nature of creative
compositions, three policies emerge that respond to these underlying
questions: the government should provide a tax incentive to creators
for charitable contributions of their creative property; this incentive
should be available only to creators with charitable motivations; and,
secures him no tax benefits; he could have achieved the same $7 reduction in taxes by
contributing $10 in cash. Moreover, if this artist had sold the property at its market
value of $100, paid a maximum 50% tax on the $90 gain, and donated his S100 pre-tax
revenue to a charity, he would have received a tax benefit of $25 (.7($100) - .5($100 - $10))
and earned a $15 profit, subtracting his costs. Thus, not only is there not a tax advantage
to contributing appreciated property over cash, but there may be a sizable disadvantage
to giving property.
15. The limitation on deductions for contributions of ordinary income property to the
basis of the property creates a vast disparity, because typically the ratio of cost to market
value for creative compositions of any significant market value is very small. In the case
of a painter, the basis is the cost of materials used in creating a painting. Because the
greatest portion of this cost is often the frame, the painter receives almost the same tax
benefit for contributing an empty frame as he would for contributing a valuable paint-
ing. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 6022 (testimony of John B. Hightower, President,
Associated Councils of the Arts) (estimating cost of oils and canvas for typical painting at
.$45); id. at 6128 (letter from Glenn A. Anderson, Executive Director, Alford House,
Anderson Fine Arts Center, Anderson, Indiana, to the Artists Equity Association of New
York) (estimating materials cost for Robert Motherwell collage at $.50); id. at 6118 (testi-
mony of Elias Newman, Chairman, Conference of American Artists) (estimating cost of
Rembrandt ink drawing at $.04). For a musical or literary composer, the deduction would
normally cover only the cost of pencil and paper. See id. at 6107 (testimony of Herman
Wouk) (estimating cost of 5,000-page Wouk manuscript at $30-$40).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. See note 3 supra.
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any such tax provision should reflect considerations of horizontal
equity and economic efficiency.
A. Provision of an Incentive
The need for government intervention to increase public access to
creative compositions stems from the private market's inability to
provide an optimal level of access to these artistic goods. Identi-
fication of the proper mode of government intervention follows from
an analysis of the distribution among individuals of preferences for
creative goods.
1. The Need for Government Intervention
Creative compositions are social goods; that is, they are goods that
can yield benefits not reserved to the single individual who owns
them.18 If a painting or historical work is made available to the public,
many people other than the owner can enjoy it. Certain charitable
organizations 19 such as government or private nonprofit museums and
18. Social goods are also called "public goods" or "collective goods" by economists.
The term "social good" is used throughout this Note, because the term "public good"
confuses the good itself with a frequent source of its provision. Because social goods can
be provided by both public and private institutions, the term "public good" is misleading.
See B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 73 n.18 (1977). Two prominent public
finance economists describe clean air as a social good as follows:
If I consume a hamburger or wear a pair of shoes, these particular products will not
be available to other individuals. My and their consumption stand in a rival relation-
ship. This is the situation with private goods. But now consider measures to reduce
air pollution. If a given air quality improvement is obtained, the resulting gain will
be available to all who breathe. In other words, consumption of such products by
various individuals is not "rival" in the sense that one's partaking of benefits does
not reduce the benefits available to others.
R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (2d ed. 1976).
Clean air is an example of a social good that is both non-rival and non-excludable.
The term "social good" also is applied to goods that are non-rival but excludable.
Creative compositions, for example, are excludable-enjoyment of the benefits can be
restricted to those who pay an admission fee-but non-rival; in this case, exclusion is
feasible, but inefficient. See id. at 51-53.
It is difficult to prove that any goods are pure social goods. See id. at 56-59 (discussing
theory of "mixed goods" with both social and private features). Yet many goods seem to
have significant social-good aspects. Even though the benefits of an elementary and
secondary education are largely internalized to the student there are also substantial
benefits to others. See Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 124 (R. Solo ed. 1955), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 133 (C. Benson ed. 1963) (education has "neighborhood effect"
in promoting a stable and democratic society). See generally R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY
OF PUBLIC FINANCE 9-12, 43-44 (1959); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra, at 7-9, 49-59;
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 Rv. ECON. & STATISTICS 387
(1954).
19. The term "charitable organization" is used in this Note to refer to an organization
qualified to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. The organizations that com.-
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libraries attempt to satisfy the broad demand for the use and enjoy-
ment of creative compositions by providing public access to musical,
literary, scientific, historical, and artistic works.
20
prise this category are those "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster . . . amateur sports competition . . . or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). But see I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (tracking I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) but adding organizations "testing for public
safety"). The use of the term "charitable organization" in this Note is intended to connote
any among the class of § 170(c)(2) or § 501(c)(3) organizations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501
(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1960) (discussion of narrow and broad scopes of meaning of "charitable
organizations").
The fact that charitable organizations, like governments, produce social goods distin-
guishes them from private market organizations: it explains their nonprofit status and
their reliance on subsidies such as tax-exemption and private and government contribu-
tions, rather than on admission charges, as the principal means of financial support. See
B. WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 1-3 (charitable organizations produce social goods); id. at
93-158 (attempt to separate production of social goods and private goods in various
charitable organizations).
20. In the case of creative compositions, only when such compositions are accessible to
the public is their potential as a social good realized. Thus, throughout this Note, the
"amount of production" or "level of output" of social goods refers to the quantity of
public access to these compositions. The focus of attention is the shifting of creative
compositions from private to public uses. The total quantity of new creative work
produced in the country is not discussed. Since the elasticity of supply of artistic goods is
probably very low, it is unlikely that the total quantity will be significantly affected by
changes in incentives to donate. Creative compositions are of two basic types: works of
visual art; and literary and musical compositions, letters, memoranda, and papers. The
two types are treated similarly by I.R.C. § 1221(3). The two differ, however, in that the
former category consists of property that is the creator's intended output, while the latter
group consists of incidental by-products of the creator's efforts. Thus, an author may
write a novel and sell the rights to a publisher; his manuscript and notes are incidental.
Aside from speculative demand for a creator's papers, this latter type of property is not
normally considered in private demand, except for an occasional idiosyncratic hobbyist or
snob. Investment purpose is excluded from private demand because it does not represent
final demand-consumption-but rather demand based on anticipation of some other
future demand. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that literary, musical, and his-
torical compositions have minimal private-good aspects.
Artistic compositions, however, have a more clearly defined private-good component.
There is a flourishing private market in art, not all of which can be viewed as specula-
tion. The remaining private demand cannot be characterized as due solely to snobs or
obscure collectors. Copies of works of art do not meet the purposes of the originals, while
copies of novels do. Thus, while it is not common for an individual to purchase the
manuscript of, and right of reproduction to, a novel for his own enjoyment, it is normal
for an art collector to do the equivalent.
Access to art may be rival in another sense as well. If the admission of an additional
individual to a museum imposes no additional costs, the admission is warranted. Often,
however, an additional admission will impose a crowding cost on the other viewers. In
this case the composition has ceased to become a pure public good as consumption is, to
a degree, rival. For the effects of this complication, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
supra note 18, at 615-22; Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 EcoNoMIcA 1
(1965).
It is relatively easy to separate the private- and social-goods aspects of literary com-
positions. The former demand is met through paperback and hardcover book sales, while
the latter is satisfied by research libraries. Public libraries also provide access to general,
nonresearch materials seemingly closer to private goods, but that can be explained as an
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Because the benefits derived from social goods are available to all
individuals once they have been provided to the public by a single
individual, the private market system does not produce the optimal
amount of social goods. The market system produces the optimal level
of private goods because consumers know that if they do not pay for a
particular good, they will not be able to consume it; therefore, each
consumer demands goods up to the point at which the marginal benefits
to him no longer exceed the marginal costs of an additional unit.2 1
However, social goods yield benefits to individuals other than the
purchaser. 22 Thus, the total marginal benefit to society will be greater
than the individual purchaser's marginal benefit. When each individual
equates his marginal benefit with his marginal cost to determine the
quantity he purchases, he ignores "external" benefits, that is, the
benefits that flow to other people. The optimal quantity of a social
good, however, is the amount at which the total marginal benefit-not
the individual marginal benefit-equals marginal cost.23 Because the
private market recognizes only individual benefits, the market system
will generate a deficient level of social goods.24 This suboptimal level
educational function. See B. WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 60-61, 152-56. While art may
not be as pure a social good as are other types of compositions, the social-good component
of art seems dominant.
The role of charitable organizations that provide public access to creative compositions
is conceived in this Note as primarily the production of social goods. Two alternative
functions exist. First, charitable organizations may be viewed as distribution-oriented,
rather than efficiency-motivated, institutions. In this view, individuals support artistic
institutions not because they value the output of those organizations for themselves, but
because they wish to increase the utility of others who may desire access to artistic com-
positions. Although economists have traditionally treated such distributional concerns as
distinct from the micro-economic analysis used in this Note, distributional preferences
have recently begun to be analyzed within the efficiency framework as another social-
goods preference. See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 Am.
ECON. REV. 542 (1969). The second alternative approach, not so easily integrated with this
analysis, is that individuals contribute to artistic institutions to change, not to satisfy,
the preferences of other individuals. If this motivation can be considered the mere
provision of information, the analysis is secure. In any other case, the view threatens the
economist's assumption of "consumer sovereignty," a necessary element of the demand
analysis used in this Note.
21. This point is the equilibrium point, where supply is equal to demand. See R.
P)ORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 21-25, 107-42 (3d ed. 1978) (explaining consumer demand
theory).
22. See A. Picou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-79 (1920) (discussing "externalities,"
the divergence of private and social costs and benefits); Mishan, The Postwar Literature
on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1971) (reviewing litera-
ture on externalities and discussing relationship between social goods and externalities).
23. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSCRAVE, supra note 18, at 53-55 (comparing optimal
production of private goods and social goods).
24. A simple graphic illustration may be helpful. In the case of a social good, in-
dividual benefits may be summed to represent a demand schedule, such as Dt-D, in
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should be remedied by the government if it can do so at a cost lower
than that sustained as a result of the failure of the private market
system.
2 5
Figure 1, when the true total benefits, including external benefits of the good, would
really be represented by D.-D.. In this case, the market mechanism will lead to the point
El, where quantity produced is q, and price is pl.
Price
B




However, if the external demand, which is not reflected in the private market system, is
taken into account, the optimal point of production is E,, with price p. and quantity
q . The difference between q. and q, represents the shortfall from the optimal level of
production. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 56-57 (benefit externalities
from private consumption).
Where the number of individuals is large, the individual benefits may be so dominated
by the external benefits that the market does not produce any of the social good. See id.
at 8.
Since the benefits are available to all, consumers will not voluntarily offer payments
to the suppliers of social goods. Each will benefit as much from the consumption of
others as from his or her own, and with thousands or millions of other consumers
present, the individual's payment is only an insignificant part of the total. Hence, no
voluntary payment is made. The linkage between producer and consumer is broken.
Id. This phenomenon, called the "free rider" problem, is discussed in J. BUCHANAN, THE
DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 77-99 (1968).
25. Because of the existence of "market failure," the optimal solution is not possible
and a "second-best" situation exists. See T. SCrrOVSKY, VELFARE AND COMPETITION 481
(1971); Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11,
11-18 (1956). Government intervention will have costs, as will a laissez-faire policy: for
example, administrative costs, costs of incorrectly calculating preferences for social goods,
and costs of distortions caused by the government's taxing system. Only if these costs are
less than the costs imposed by the market failure, see note 24 supra (in Figure 1, the costs
are represented by the triangle BEIE.), is intervention warranted. This point is repeated
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2. The Form of Government Intervention
The most common form of government intervention in the produc-
tion of social goods is through direct provision of the goods.26 Direct
government provision of a social good would lead to the optimal level
of output if the government could provide the good in the amount at
which the sum of individuals' marginal benefits equals marginal costs.
Direct provision under any other rule generates a suboptimal level of
the social good.2 7 Analysis of direct provision as a mode of intervention
must focus on whether decisionmaking mechanisms exist that would
lead the government to provide the optimal level of social goods.
Most models of government decisionmaking predict that the govern-
ment cannot provide social goods in accord with the optimal marginal
benefit rule.28 One simple method of government decisionmaking is
majority voting. Under majority voting, if there are no significant op-
portunities to influence the vote by coalitions or logrolling 2 9 the level
frequently in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 9- EcoN. 1 (1960). If the interven-
tion is not justified on resource cost grounds, the laissez-faire allocation may be the
second-best solution, and government intervention may lead to a less, rather than a more,
efficient allocation of resources. See T. SCITOVSKY, supra, at 480-86.
26. For example, the federal government directly provides public access to creative
compositions, primarily through budgetary funding of the National Endowment for the
Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Smithsonian Institution, and the
Library of Congress.
27. See Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POLITICAL ECON. 571, 572 (1959)
(defects in direct provision models).
28. According to traditional analysis, there is no effective way for the government to
discover each individual's marginal benefits. See R. MuscRAVE & P. musGRAVE, supra
note 18, at 74-77. Recently, however, economists have suggested ways of obtaining this
information. One proposal involves use of a special taxing and voting procedure. See
Tideman & Tullock, A New and Superior Process for Making Public Choices, 84 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 1145 (1976) (Clarke tax mechanism may lead to accurate revelation of
preferences). The preference revelation mechanism proposed by Tideman and Tullock
would require all voters to express their preferences for each of such a large number of
goods-here, the entire spectrum of creative compositions-that the system would be
administratively infeasible. Another approach suggests that individuals choose among
bundles of social goods provided by different local jurisdictions when they select their
residence. See Ti(- jout, A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL
EcON. 416 (1956) (individual place-of-residence decisions may reflect demand for different
levels of social goods). The Tiebout hypothesis applies only to goods with social-goods
externalities that are limited geographically and that are, therefore, provided by local
governments. Because creative compositions are nationally available social goods, en-
couraging production is a federal, rather than solely a local, issue. Barring the considera-
tion of immigration and emigration as a preference revelation mechanism, the Tiebout
hypothesis cannot be applied to social goods that are provided on a nationwide basis.
29. A simple majority voting rule assumes that each individual has one vote to be
exercised individually on an issue, in isolation from other issues (no logrolling) and
other voters (no coalitions). Furthermore, it assumes that the cost of goods approved
by the majority voting model will be borne equally by all individuals, regardless of how
they voted.
The no-logrolling assumption is reasonable given the congressional process for de-
termining the level of direct provision of public access to creative compositions. One
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of government production of a social good is determined by the prefer-
ences of the median voter, who has distributed on each side of him an
equal number of voters who prefer either more or less of the good.30
The median voter chooses the level of output for society by equating
his marginal taxes (his proportionate share of the cost of marginal
output) with his marginal benefits. Unless tastes are perfectly homo-
geneous, some voters will desire a greater level of production and
model of congressional logrolling suggests that Congressmen array themselves on com-
mittees providing social goods that their constituents demand disproportionately highly.
See W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 138-46 (1971). For
example, the Congressmen whose constituents demand great amounts of national defense
sit on the committees setting the level of direct provision of defense, and so forth for
each social good. Direct provision of public access to creative compositions, however,
through funding of the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment
for the Humanities, is primarily determined by the Interior Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee. Budgeting for public access to creative compositions accounts
for less than 2% of the funds appropriated by this subcommittee. See H. REP. No. 392,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 14, 107 (1977). It is likely, therefore, that the Congressmen on the
subcommittee are logrolling for social goods other than public access to creative com-
positions.
30. This simple majority voting result is sometimes known as the median voter rule.
See Steiner, The Public Sector and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY
ANALYSIs 46 (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970).
This analysis applies technically only to homogeneous goods. Because the set of all
creative compositions is not a single homogeneous good, each differentiated type of com-
position should be considered individually. The under-production outcome will obtain
for each good that has a downward-skewed demand distribution, albeit to a different
degree depending on the relative skewness of the distributions.
Although differentiated goods technically cannot be aggregated, it is appropriate for
convenience to treat public access to each charitable organization as a distinct good, con-
sisting of the portfolio of the museum or library. Then, instead of examining the op-
timality of public access to discrete compositions, the analysis aggregates to the level of
each creative mix presented to the public by a charitable organization.
Because of the diversity among creative compositions, a vote on each particular type of
composition ivould not be administratively feasible. Yet if a vote simply determined the
total amount of money to be spent on increased public access, under the government
provision model some decision would have to be made as to how the funds should be
allocated among various types of creative compositions. The more democratic the alloca-
tion process, the greater the restraint on diversity, minority expression, and innovation
would be. On the other hand, the more the allocation mechanism is insulated from
majoritarian tastes, the more likely the allocation would be biased toward the particular
preferences of the officials distributing the funds.
The major source of direct provision of creative compositions by the government is
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the
Humanities (NEH). As predicted, each of these organizations has been criticized for being
both too elitist and too popularistic. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1975, § II, at 1, col. 4
(debate between Herbert Gans and Ernest van der Haag on NEA funding of "popular"
versus "high" culture); Editorial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1977, § IV, at 10, col. I (art
necessarily elitist; merit cannot be measured by voting). Complaints recently have become
widespread that the arts bureaucracies have become overly politicized and too responsive
to ethnic, geographic, and demographic concerns. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1977,
§ II, at 1, col. 4 (Joseph Duffey's selection as NEH head due to political motivations);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1977, § II, at 36, col. 1 (same criticism of Livingston Biddle, Jr.'s
appointment as head of NEA); Editorial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1977, § IV, at 10, col. 1
(commenting on ethnic and geographical criteria for allocation of funds).
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others will prefer a lower output than is selected; only the median
voter will be perfectly satisfied. Under the plausible assumption that
the population's preferences for social goods such as creative composi-
tions are skewed toward a lower level of output,35 the output selected
by the median voter will always be less than the optimal output.32
31. This assumption will be satisfied if tastes are asymmetrically distributed in such a
way that the median preference is lower than the mean preference. This condition is al-
most certainly true for creative compositions. Although data on the distribution of
preferences for creative compositions are thin, existing evidence supports the assumption.
A survey of library use in New Jersey found that 54% of the sample had not been in a
library in the year preceding the study, while 16% of the population used a library at
least once a month. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, § XI, at 1, col. 7. Interpolation yields a
mean use of roughly four times a year-obviously greater than the median use of zero
times a year. This skewed distribution is apparent in other fields with estimated median
attendance figures of zero. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1975, § II, at 1, col. 4 (Harris poll
reported that only 49% of respondents ever attended art museums). More robust evidence
is available for performing arts organizations, which do not provide creative compositions
but which may exhibit similar preference patterns. See FORD FOUNDATION, 2 THE FINANCES
OF THE PERFORMING ARTS 11 (1974) (study found that 77% of population had not at-
tended live ballet, theater, opera, or symphony performance in past year).
32. Assume there are three voters whose linear demand curves (represented by D, D2,
and D in Figure 2) for one particular type of social good are symmetrically distributed,
parallel, and non-negative. In this case, the optimal output is at equilibrium point E,
where the social demand curve D., obtained by summing vertically DI, D., and D, inter-
sects S, the supply or marginal cost curve, assumed here to be horizontal. At this optimal
allocation, price is j and output is q.. The median voter rule equilibrates the median
voter's preference with the share of the costs he bears, which is j of 1 or- , assuming
proportional taxation. This equality is established at E,, where output is q,. Thus, the
median voter rule generates an output of q,, which is less than q., the optimal output.
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Among the individuals who desire more of a social good than is
provided through the majority voting model, some may value addi-
tional output highly enough to supplement the government's direct
provision. These individuals may make private contributions to chari-
This result can be proved as follows: By relaxing the non-negativity assumption, the
demand curve of individual i can be written (assuming that all demand curves are paral-
lel) as
P, = at - bq
and his supply curve as
VPs n
where n is the number of voters. Under the median voter rule (assuming that n is odd),
quantity q, is determined by the condition that the median voter, individual v, is just
willing to pay the marginal cost to him:




Under the optimal social-goods rule, quantity q. is determined by the condition that the
sum of the individual willingnesses to pay is equal to the social cost:




If the demand curves are asymmetrically skewed downward,
n




nT < i-l n n
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Thus we know that
qv < qO.
Now the non-negativity assumption can be added. Then, under the optimal social-
goods rule, quantity qo* is described by the condition
a -- jbqo*p,
i=1
where j is the index of the interval a <q< aj in which q falls.
n j n
a4 1-nbqo*= : a-jbqo*+ y a, - (n- j) bq.*.
i=l i=l i=j+l
ajSince -s < q °0 , we have
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table organizations that provide the particular social good.33 Because
of the free-rider problem that is endemic to social goods, however, this
additional private output still will not generate the optimal level of
production.3
4
Thus, both private markets and government provision will generate
less than the optimal level of output of social goods. However, a hybrid
solution may remedy much of the deficiency. Recall that the median
voter determines the amount of a social good to be provided by the
government by equating his marginal costs and his marginal benefits.
He values additional output, but not enough to pay his full share of
the marginal costs. Other individuals, however, are already supple-
n 5 5
$ a1 -nbqo*< a-jbqo0 +(n-j) bq* - (n -j) bqo* < a,--jbqo*.1 ~ i=1 1=1
Since all demand curves slope downward, q0 < qo*.
Since q, < q., we have the desired result:
q < qo*.
The median voter rule leads to a suboptimal amount of public access to creative com-
positions. See Hochman & Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contribu-
tions, 80 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 2 (similar model).
33. Figure 3 shows the demand, D,, of such a person, the third voter, who will pro-
vide voluntarily (q. - qv) to supplement q, the public access provided by the government







34. That is, in Figure 3, sujpra note 33, q, is less than q., the optimal level of output.
This will be true unless S is so low that it intersects D. and D, at the same q, in which
case there is no free-rider problem because only D. values the good at that level of output.
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menting the government's output and paying the full cost of providing
additional output. The median voter would approve a higher level of
governmentally supported output if he were obligated to pay only a
portion of the marginal costs of the additional output, that is, if his
marginal costs were reduced. Similarly, the high-demand individuals
who are contributing to increase the output would contribute more
if they were not required to fund the entire cost of the additional out-
put. If the two production mechanisms, government funding through
majority vote and private provision through contributions, could be
integrated, the mutual interests of the median voter and the high-
demand individuals could be fulfilled, and the deficiency in the level
of output of social goods could be alleviated.
The charitable contributions deduction is such a mechanism: it
combines government subsidy with individual support to increase the
amount of social goods toward the optimal level.35 The median voter
is offered a chance to secure additional output of social goods by pay-
ing only his share of the marginal costs necessary to induce high-demand
individuals to increase their amount of contributions. 36 These in-
35. The difficulties inherent in using direct provision to allocate the total level of
public access among different types of creative compositions, see note 30 supra, are also
remedied by the charitable contributions deduction. The deduction avoids the problems
of elitism and popularism, by accommodating diverse preferences. The deduction also
eliminates the political defect of direct provision, as it yields an atomistic, rather than
a bureaucratic, allocation.
36. In Figure 4, the third voter would increase his private support by (q, - qr), if
his costs for doing so were reduced to S' (due to the charitable deduction). The median
voter would vote to pay (S/3)' if he were provided increased output to the level of q,.
Price
Figure 4
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dividuals, who are already contributing the total costs of providing
supplemental output, are encouraged to increase their level of con-
tributions through the partial subsidy approved by the median voter.37
The costs imposed by the charitable contributions deduction are
minimal.38 The valuation problem created by the allowance of a deduc-
tion for contributions of property does not appear troublesome. 39 It
appears that the revenue loss to the Treasury from the partial subsidy
of charitable contributions is significantly less than the amount of
resources contributed as a result of the deduction. 40
Although the charitable contributions deduction may not lead to the
optimal level of production of a social good, the deduction certainly
increases output toward that optimum. 41 Each contribution generated
by a subsidy that is approved by the median voter results in a reduction
in the shortfall from the optimal level of the good. Thus, the deduction
provides an incentive for individuals with unsatisfied demand for
public access to creative compositions to contribute such property to
charitable organizations. Under current law, creators, who may have
37. Thus, in Figure 4, supra note 36, if the tax funds raised by the subsidy, (n - 1)
(S/n)' (q. - q), are greater than or equal to the amount needed to encourage giving by
the nth voter to the level q., (S - S') (q, - q,), the median voter will approve the subsidy.
38. This analysis ignores the possible costs sustained by individuals who desire social
goods for private consumption and are made worse off when such goods are transferred
to non-excludable uses. See note 20 supra.
39. See 122 CONG. Rxc. 23,359-60 (1976) (Sen. Javits) (valuation no longer a problem);
[1978] COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENuE ANN. RElP. 43 (Art Advisory Panel has made adjust-
ments of S75 million in $276 million of claimed valuation in last 10 years).
40. See Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the
United States: A Microeconometric Analysis, in III FIIER PAPERS, supra note 5, at 1393,
1394, 1413 (earlier studies unreliable; net incentive effects strong); Feldstein & Taylor, The
Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Estimates and Simulations with the Treasury
Tax Files, in III FILER PAPERS, supra note 5, at 1419, 1437 (strong evidence of net incen-
tive effect); McDaniel, Study of Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions,
in IV FrER PAPERS, supra note 5, at 2417, 2435-43 (survey of econometric and opinion
polling literature).
41. Any subsidy that is approved by the median voter and that stimulates additional
contributions necessarily mitigates the deficiency in the production of a social good. That
is, if any additional contribution results from the subsidy, output has been increased to
q,, beyond qp and toward q.. See note 36 sutra.
An ideal subsidy scheme would offer a different level of subsidy for contributions tend-
ing to increase public access to each different type of creative composition, depending
on the relative magnitudes of shortfalls in access to each type. The charitable contribu-
tion deduction cannot be tailored to achieve that precise goal, however, because it does
not depend on the type of access that is subsidized. As a result, public access to some
types of compositions inevitably will be over-subsidized and public access to other types
under-subsidized. The deduction also is imperfect in that it benefits contributors in pro-
portion to their marginal tax rates and offers no subsidy to nontaxpaying or non-item-
izing donors, thereby biasing the mix of increased public access to creative compositions
toward that demanded by high-income taxpayers and exacerbating the inequality of the
distribution of wealth. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 32, at 7-10 (proportionality
of deduction subsidies to income generates suboptimal allocation).
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the strongest demand for public access to creative compositions, are
provided the least incentive to contribute. Providing these artists with
an incentive to contribute their compositions would help achieve an
optimal level of public access to each type of creative composition.
42
B. Generation of an Accurate Revelation of Preferences
The justification for the charitable contributions deduction rests on
the ability of private philanthropy to reveal information about in-
dividuals' unsatisfied preferences for social goods. To achieve an op-
timal production of social goods, however, two types of preferences
must be revealed: the total level of demand for social goods, and the
allocation of that demand among various types of social goods. The
charitable contributions deduction should be structured to provide
accurate information about both sets of preferences.
Claimed deductions can be interpreted as indicators of an individual's
demand for increased public access to creative compositions. Because
the deduction results in only a partial subsidy from the government,
the individual is undertaking a philanthropic endeavor in supporting
a charitable organization that provides the public with access to par-
ticular kinds of compositions.
However, a contribution that results in a net financial benefit to the
taxpayer, relative to his other options,
43 yields no information about
his preferences for particular social goods. Assumptions about his pref-
erences ranging from no demand to substantial demand are all equally
consistent with his demonstrated behavior.
44 The for-profit feature of
the transaction renders it likely that the normal economic goal of
profit maximization-including the minimization of transaction costs-
dominates any social-goods interest.
45 Thus, for the charitable contri-
42. In Figure 4, supra note 36, an artist may have demand D, for a particular type
of composition. Providing such an artist with a deduction subsidy will shift his cost of
contribution from S to S' and cause him to donate (q, - qp) of that type of good. If the
same artist's demand for another type of composition is represented by DI, no donation
of that type of work will result from the subsidy.
43. The only option directly comparable to donating is selling the work at its fair
market value. Other alternatives, such as holding, noncharitable giving, or bequeathing,
are unpredictable and too speculative and indeterminate for a comparison. Accordingly,
the benefit from selling is the standard used to define effects of contributing.
44. "In cases where the tax saving is so large, it is not clear how much charitable
motivation actually remains. It appears that the Government, in fact, is almost the sole
contributor to the charity." H.R. REi'. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 54, reprinted in 
[1969]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1700.
45. It is generally assumed that an individual making a profitable transaction is not
particularly interested in the characteristics of the other party to the transaction 
except
insofar as the transaction itself is affected (as, for example, by the reliability of the other
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butions deduction to be a useful indicator of individual preferences for
social goods, the deduction must never enable a taxpayer to profit more
from contributing his property than he could have benefited from
selling it.
C. Consideration of Horizontal Equity and Economic Efficiency
General principles of tax policy have evolved to mitigate undesirable
effects of individual provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on the
operation of the income tax system as a whole. These principles should
shape the specific design of the charitable contributions subsidy. One
such principle is that individuals in similar financial circumstances
should be treated similarly by the tax system. 40 This concept is termed
"horizontal equity." Another concern is that tax provisions should
exert a neutral effect on economic decisions by individuals and firms
operating in competitive markets. 47 Any influence of the tax system
on those decisions generates a misallocation of resources by interfering
with the capacity of a competitive pricing system to direct resources to
their most productive uses.48
These principles require that contributions of creative compositions
by creators and collectors should be treated as similarly as possible,
irrespective of the difference in the ways in which the contributed
compositions were acquired. The equity concern is simple: two in-
dividuals with similar incomes contributing similar property to similar
recipients are for tax purposes similarly situated; the fact that one
created his property, while the other acquired it from someone else,
should not be deemed relevant. Efficiency considerations also militate
against treating contributions of creator-held property differently from
those of collector-held property, for fear that the creator may be in-
fluenced to devote fewer of his resources to holding personally created
property and more to collecting, or investing, than would be optimal.
Moreover, for reasons of both equity and efficiency, contributions of
cash and contributions of property should be treated as similarly as
possible, inasmuch as the relevant fact for tax purposes is the value, not
party). The individual's utility is assumed to be independent of the other party's level
of consumption. When an individual does not benefit financially, it is more likely that
his utility in some way depends on the consumption of the other party.
46. See R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 160.
47. This does not imply that when markets are not functioning perfectly, as, for ex-
ample, when there is a market failure arising from the free-rider problem, they should
not be assisted in improving resource allocation. Nor does it imply that suboptimal al-
locations will never be preferred to optimal allocations for other-for example, distribu-
tional-reasons.
48. See R. DoRFMAN, supra note 21, at 196-215.
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the form, of the contribution. Equity requires that individuals with
similar incomes who donate similarly valued property receive similar
treatment by the tax system. Furthermore, the efficiency consideration
suggests that different treatment for gifts of cash and contributions of
property would lead to undesirable distortions in the decisions of in-
dividuals to acquire and dispose of their assets.
49
III. Proposal for Legislative Change
Proposed legislation should evolve from consideration of the com-
peting social objectives developed above. Amendment of the Internal
Revenue Code to provide creators a quasi-capital gains option would
reasonably satisfy these goals.
A. Reconciling the Policy Objectives
The four policy objectives-provision of an incentive for creators
to donate their compositions; assurance that such donation not be
financially preferable to sale; equal treatment of creators and collectors;
and equal treatment of gifts of cash and contributions of property-
cannot be achieved simultaneously through legislation affecting only
the tax treatment of charitable contributions by creators. Collectors are
currently provided a fair market value deduction for gifts of related-use
tangible personal property that qualifies for long-term capital gains
treatment. 50 Equal treatment for creators could enable them to benefit
49. Because the set of all creative compositions is not a single homogeneous type of
good, the amount of access to different types of compositions should reflect individual
preferences. In that way, the level of public access to each type of composition will be
optimal. For the charitable contributions deduction to be useful as an indicator of the
distribution of individuals' social goods preferences among goods, the deduction subsidy
cannot bias individuals' decisions as to how much to contribute to each potential donee
by providing differential subsidies. As an example of such a bias under present law,
donations of related-use tangible personal property are treated more favorably than con-
tributions of unrelated-use tangible personal property. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(l). Thus, an
individual may be led to donate a painting to the Museum of Modern Art even though
he prefers the work of the Red Cross, because of the preferential treatment accorded
related-use property donations. Therefore, contributions of various kinds of property and
cash should be treated similarly.
One minor justification can be offered for some differential treatment of cash and
property contributions. Creators and collectors donating creative compositions to charitable
organizations may be more informed generally about the quality differences among works
of art and artistic institutions than are members of the general public who support
organizations with cash donations. Therefore, it may be warranted to offer a greater
subsidy to contributors of property than to cash donors, in order to weigh revealed
preferences for social goods in favor of more aware donors. The information-provision
approach to contributions, see note 20 supra, also may justify the preference for dona-
tions of property. Both of these arguments, however, are vulnerable to the "elitism"
criticism of direct provision. See note 30 suPra.
50. I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 170(e)(1).
Artists
more from the donation of such property than from its sale.51 There-
fore, it is impossible both to establish parity between creators and
collectors and to ensure that gifts by creators will be less profitable
than sales, without changing the tax treatment of donations by collec-
tors. The policy that creators be treated similarly to collectors is also
in conflict with the goal that creators' gifts of cash be treated similarly
to creators' donations of property: under current law there is a disparity
in the treatment of the two types of contributions for collectors.52
Lastly, identical treatment for cash and property donations conflicts
with the goal of providing creators with an incentive to donate their
compositions, since such an incentive would be increased by more
favorable treatment of property donations.
The issues of the tax treatment of charitable contributions by collec-
tors and the taxation at ordinary income rates of sales by creators
implicate factors that render changes in this area politically infeasible.
This constraint makes it impossible to satisfy all four objectives com-
pletely. Nevertheless, legislative change must reflect the optimal accom-
modation of these goals. The policies that creators be provided with an
incentive to contribute their compositions and that such an incentive
never make contribution more lucrative than sale are mandated by
the social-good analysis above. Without a contributions subsidy, the
level of public access to creative compositions is seriously deficient.
However, a deduction rendering gifts more profitable than sales for
any individual destroys the usefulness of the preference revelation
mechanism by encouraging and subsidizing donations that do not neces-
sarily represent underlying demand for public access to compositions.
Therefore, proposed legislation should satisfy both of these policies. 53
51. Parity between creators and collectors would violate the rule that r 7r,; for cre-
ators, because creators are taxed on sales at ordinary income rates, while collectors are
not. See note 7 supra.
52. See note 8 supra.
53. Two recent types of legislative proposals to restore an incentive for charitable
contributions by creators of creative compositions would allow creators to benefit more
from contributing their compositions than from selling them, thereby violating the re-
quirement that the government not reward solely self-interested motivations. A return
to the fair market value deduction, see note 7 supra, has been proposed in recent bills.
See, e.g., H.R. 10429, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 1739, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977);
H.R. 2046, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). No action was taken on any of these bills.
The second type of proposal would allow a deduction in the amount of basis plus
75% of unrealized appreciation. This proposal typically includes a limitation that de-
ductions for charitable contributions of creative compositions may be taken for amounts
not greater than income from the sale of creative compositions. A creator in the 70%
bracket on unearned income who paints a painting that cost $100 in materials and has
a market value of $1500 is in the following situation: if he sells the painting, he earns
$1500 before taxes on an investment of $100, for a taxable income of $1400, upon which
he pays a 50% tax, thus netting him $700 after taxes. By contributing the painting, he
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The principles establishing similar tax treatment for cash and
property contributions and parity between creators and collectors must
be compromised. Any compromise will both provide donors of ap-
preciated property with some advantage over contributors of cash and
to some extent favor collectors over creators. Nevertheless, proposed
legislation should accommodate these principles to the extent possible,
given the constraints of the other two policy goals and of other pro-
visions in the Code. 4
B. A Legislative Proposal
The unfavorable treatment accorded contributions of creator-held
compositions stems from the characterization of these works as ordinary
income property, rather than capital gains property. Yet much of the
value of creator-held appreciated property derives from a phenomenon
more easily analogized to the accrual of capital gains than to the earn-
ing of ordinary income. A deduction provision that provided capital
gains treatment for the portion of unrealized appreciation attributable
to long-term investment and ordinary income treatment for the amount
derived from personal effort would be grounded more soundly in tax
theory than would other recent legislative proposals.5 5
is entitled to a deduction of the $100 basis plus 75% of the $1400 appreciation, for a
total of $1150. This deduction reduces his taxes (assuming he has other creative and
investment income) by $805 (.7 x $1150), earning him a net gain of $705 ($805 - $100 cost).
Thus, this high-income artist has obtained a $5 benefit by contributing instead of selling
his -work. In general, a gift would be more profitable than a sale whenever m > 
C+5
C + .75A
(see note 7 supra for explanation of notation). As C/A approaches zero, this requirement
simplifies to m>2/3. Under no circumstances when m<2/3 can rg>7r,. Furthermore,
the greater C/A is, the greater m must be for 7rg> 7r. If m = .7, then 7rg > 7r. only when
.75m- .5>C/.
C/A<I/12. (,r,>7rs only if - >CA.)1-rn
Two bills provided for a deduction of basis plus 75% of appreciation: S. 1435, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) and H.R. 6057, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). No action was taken
on either bill.
54. One recent proposal would provide a tax credit of 30% of market value, while
limiting the credit to the amount of tax imposed on creative-source income. See, e.g.,
H.R. 10445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1384, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 439,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). A floor amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 providing
a credit passed the Senate but was dropped in conference and did not become law. See
122 CONG. REC. 25,631 (1976); H. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1976).
This credit proposal violates the goal of consistent treatment of individuals by retaining
a deduction for gifts of collector-held property but providing a credit for contributions
of creator-held property. The credit scheme causes distortions, such as providing an
incentive to creators to contribute even if they do not itemize deductions, but providing
no subsidy for donations by other non-itemizing taxpayers. These distortions are so great
that the credit proposal can be ruled out on the basis of the similar treatment goal alone.
55. The individual classification of business assets as capital or non-capital assets upon
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The policy goals discussed above generally would be satisfied by
amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow creators the option of
having compositions valued upon completion and paying a tax at
ordinary income rates at the time of gift on the difference between the
fair market value at the time of completion and the basis, in return for
allowing them a portion of appreciation to be deducted upon gift.
Under this quasi-capital gains proposal, a creator exercising the option
and contributing his composition to a charitable organization would
be entitled to deduct at the time of contribution the full fair market
value of the property, less forty percent"6 of the unrealized appreciation
that accrued between the time of contribution and the time of com-
pletion.5 7
The proposed option would restore an incentive for creators to
contribute their creative compositions to charitable organizations.58
the sale of a business is roughly analogous. See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d
Cir. 1955).
Two recent proposals rely on arbitrary formulas that bear no apparent relation to the
present tax treatment of collectors. The first proposal would allow a fixed percentage
deduction in the amount of basis plus 50% of unrealized appreciation. See, e.g., H.R.
7577, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REG. 36,636-37 (1972) (Senate version only). The
second proposal would allow a graduated percentage of appreciation deduction based
on the donor's marginal tax bracket. A sliding percentage of appreciation would be de-
ductible, and the scale could be graduated to ensure that sale always would be preferable
financially to contribution. In testimony before the Ways and Means Committee in 1973,
the Authors League of America supported such a graduated deduction. See 1973 HEARINGS,
supra note 2, at 6112-13.
56. Under current law, 60% of capital gains income is excluded from taxation. I.R.C.
§ 1202(a). Under certain circumstances, the reduction in the allowable deduction would
have to be by an amount greater than 40% of the post-completion appreciation. See note
59 infra.
57. Under the proposal, a creator could elect to claim a deduction for a charitable
contribution of his creative compositions based on the fair market value, less 40% of
the unrealized appreciation that accrued after completion of the composition. In order
to claim the optional deduction, the creator would be required to pay income tax at
ordinary income rates on the difference between the fair market value of the composition
immediately upon its completion and its basis. The creator could be required to have
the composition valued upon completion to preserve his ability to claim the optional
deduction should he ever contribute the work to a charitable organization. However,
for administrative convenience and ease of compliance, a mechanical allocation rule
could be provided. For example, the ordinary income component of the appreciation
could be treated as having accrued over a one-year period and the total appreciation
could be allocated between ordinary income and capital gains on a Pro rata time basis.
Such a rule could be made optional to allow the taxpayer to elect to submit proof of
earlier valuation in lieu of mechanical allocation.
58. Beginning with the example in note 53 supra, add the assumption that the paint-
ing was worth $400 when it was completed. Under present law, the creator loses $30
by contributing his painting (7rg = -$100 + .7($100)). Under the option, however, the
creator pays a tax of $150 on the appreciation attributable to his personal efforts
(.5($400 - $100)) and receives a deduction upon gift of $1060 ($1500 - A($1500 - $400))
for a tax benefit of $742 (.7 X $1060). Thus, his net gain totals $492 ($742 - $100 - $150).
Generally, 7rg = A, (m - .5) + .6mA2 - C(I - in), where A, is the difference between fair
market value at time of completion and basis, and A2 is the difference between fair mar-
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At the same time, it would be impossible for a creator to benefit more
from contributing a composition than from selling it.59 The option also
would reduce the disparity between the treatment of gifts of property
and of cash donations by taxing a portion of the appreciation at
ordinary income rates as a condition for claiming a deduction for the
remainder of the appreciation.60 Finally, the proposal would roughly
equalize the treatment of creators and collectors. By allowing creators
a deduction that accounts for unrealized appreciation, while taxing
them on the ordinary income appreciation, the treatment of creators
would match the tax situation of collectors.
61
ket value at time of gift and market value at time of completion. The examples and
formulas in this section assume a taxpayer in the maximum tax brackets of 50% on
earned income and 70% on unearned income. Different configurations of earned and
unearned income will lead to varying results.
59. This can be proved as follows: 7rg < 7r_ because 7rg = (m - .5)A 1 + .6mA. - C(l -
in), which is always less than 7r, = .5A 1 + .5A., because (in - .5)A, < .5A 1, .6mA, < .5A2,
and C(I - in) > 0, whenever .5 i m < .7, and C, A1, and A. are all positive.
For high-income taxpayers with little earned income relative to unearned income, it is
possible for the marginal tax rate on earned income to exceed 50% in spite of the
maximum tax provision, I.R.C. § 1348. See Sunley, The Maximum Tax on Earned Income,
27 NAT'L TAX J. 543, 544-45 (1974) (effects of maximum tax limited by rule stacking
earned income before unearned income). In this case, the formulas above are inapplicable,
and the percentage of A. allowed to be deducted under the proposal must be reduced
to ensure that 7rg < r.. Therefore, the taxpayer must first determine his marginal tax
rate without benefit of the deduction; if the marginal rate exceeds 62%-but his earned
income alone would not put him in the 70% bracket-the deductible amount of the
contribution must be reduced by a percentage of A, that increases with the marginal
rate for the tax brackets between .62 and .70 as follows:




.70 .58 of A,.
Only if in < .62, or if in = .70 even without considering any unearned income, should
the taxpayer reduce his deduction by only 40% of A2.
60. The proposed treatment of the ordinary income portion of the appreciation is to
tax this "earned income" at 50% and to allow a deduction at 70%. Thus, the net effect
of the proposal is to allow a net tax benefit for the appreciation attributable to ordinary
income. This treatment can be distinguished from the nondeductibility of charitable
contributions of personal services under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1972). The donation
of creative compositions constitutes the relinquishment of ownership rights to property,
while the donation of services does not entail a transfer of any property interest. See
Goss v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 594, 596 (1973) (donation of completed manuscript different
from donation of services and blank paper because donor maintained physical ownership
over property before donation).
61. A collector earns money in some manner and pays income tax on it when it is
earned. He then invests a portion of his after-tax income in creative property. If the
property appreciates, he may sell it and pay a capital gains tax on his income (assuming
he holds it for at least one year), he may contribute the property to a related-use donee
organization and receive a deduction of the work's fair market value, or he may con-
tribute it to an unrelated-use organization and deduct the fair market value less 40%
of the unrealized appreciation. But see note 59 supra. The proposal in this Note parallels
166
Artists
This separation of the unrealized appreciation into an ordinary in-
come portion and a capital gains portion represents an application of
the familiar capital asset concept. The division maintains the general
distinction between ordinary income property as property produging
business income and capital gains property as property generating in-
vestment income.02 It does so by treating gains in the value of the
composition arising from the creator's personal efforts as ordinary in-
come, while treating subsequent appreciation arising from the creator's
investment in his own composition after its completion similarly to
capital gains. The proposed option satisfies the primary objectives for
statutory tax treatment of creator-held creative compositions while
satisfying to the extent possible other goals of tax policy.
the last situation of the collector as closely as possible. Both pay an ordinary income
tax on the income attributable to their personal efforts; both receive a deduction upon
gift of market value less 40% of investment appreciation. The proposed treatment for
creators does not match the present taxation of collectors who sell their work or con-
tribute it to a related-use organization. The latter provision is inconsistent with the
requirement that gifts not be financially advantageous relative to sales. See pp. 160-61
supra. Although the analysis of creators' gifts could be applied similarly to gifts of
other types of property and to gifts of other donors, and greater parity could be estab-
lished, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note because of the number of additional
complex issues involved. In addition, an argument can be made for capital gains treat-
ment of sales of creator-held compositions, see note 62 infra, but, because the issue re-
quires lengthy discussion, it is not considered in this Note.
62. See L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
3 (1951), reprinted in B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION
490 (1972) (distinguishing capital gains from ordinary income); Surrey, Definitional Prob-
lems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985 (1956) (same); Miller, Capital Gains
Treatment of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE
L.J. 1 (1954) (taxation of gains from personal effort).
